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The nosocomial infection rate in U.S. hospitals in the
early 1980s was 5.7% (1). Two million Americans acquire a
nosocomial infection each year (2), at a rate of 5 per 100
admissions (5%). These infections cost $4.5 billion annually,
and 88,000 patients die from them each year; 70% of
infections are due to organisms resistant to at least one
antimicrobial agent. Although 1.8 million fewer patients were
admitted to U.S. hospitals in 1995 than in 1975 (35.9 million
vs. 37.7 million) and the average length of stay was lower (5.3
days in 1995 vs. 7.9 days in 1975), the national nosocomial
rate was increasing. In 1975, there were 7.18 nosocomial
infections per 1,000 patient days compared to 9.77 in 1995, an
increase of 36% (2).
Major nosocomial pathogens increasingly resistant to
antimicrobial drugs include Escherichia coli, Staphylococcus
aureus, coagulase-negative staphylococci, Enterococcus spe-
cies,  and  Pseudomonas aeruginosa (3-4). Infections from
methicillin-resistant staphylococci, vancomycin-resistant
enterococci (VRE), and aminoglycoside-resistant Pseudomo-
nas spp. are becoming common (5-6).
The clinical laboratory has several critical roles in
controlling hospital-acquired infections: accurately identify-
ing nosocomial pathogens, detecting unexpected antimicro-
bial-drug resistance, and epidemiologic typing (7). Most new
rapid tests are not yet helpful for infection control purposes,
and automated systems for bacterial identification and
susceptibility testing are not as reliable as desired for
detecting organisms with emerging drug resistance (7).
However, the laboratory can make key contributions through
epidemiologic typing, particularly by collaborating with the
infection control team during outbreak investigations (8).
Molecular techniques for establishing the presence or absence
of clonality can be very effective in tracking the spread of
infections caused by genetically related pathogens (9-14).
We formed a permanent, integrated infection control and
prevention program that fully incorporates infection control,
infectious disease, pharmacy, and clinical microbiology
personnel into a single working group to minimize hospital
infections (15).  We discuss our overall experience with such a
program, which has been in place at Northwestern Memorial
Hospital for more than 5 years. Our hospital, located in
Chicago, is a 700-bed, university-affiliated medical center
with more than 39,000 annual discharges, 56,000 emergency
cases, and 260,000 annual outpatient visits. We initially
postulated that our integrated infection control program
could be medically and economically successful in minimizing
the incidence of hospital-acquired infections. The laboratory’s
role was enhanced by introducing a molecular typing section
within the Division of Clinical Microbiology; this section
rapidly and systematically determines clonality and reports
results immediately to the infection control practitioners so
that they can quickly take appropriate action (3). We describe
our experience with such a program after the first 60 months
of its existence and compare its effect with the 24 months
immediately before this expanded effort.
Methods
Nosocomial Infections
Nosocomial infections are detected by ongoing surveil-
lance in intensive care units (ICUs), special-care nurseries,
and post-surgery units. Standard infection definitions are
used (16). The data we report represent the total number of
nosocomial infections per 1,000 patient days, and the number
of patients with nosocomial infections per 100 patient
discharges (percentage of patients with nosocomial infection).
Methods for data collection include review of microbiology
reports and patients’ medical records, direct observation of
medical and nursing practice, active surveillance of rectal
cultures of patients in  nursing units for high-risk patients,
and evaluation of suspected nosocomial infections reported by
health-care providers. Three full-time infection control
professionals collect the infection data. Interpretation,
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assessment, and planning of any intervention(s) are
performed under the direction of the medical director of the
hospital’s infection control and prevention department.
Two interventions were made simultaneously to enhance
the overall program: a molecular typing laboratory and a
weekly planning meeting. The meeting included representa-
tives from infection control, diagnostic medical microbiology
(molecular epidemiology), pharmacy, and infectious diseases.
Observation Periods
The preintervention assessment for this evaluation
began on September 1, 1992, the start of our 1993 fiscal year
(FY). Data were collected and assessed by quarters for 2 years,
through the fourth quarter, FY94 (June through August
1994). Initiating the weekly meetings and establishing the
molecular typing laboratory occurred during the fourth
quarter FY94; the laboratory was fully operational in the first
quarter FY95. The intervention time was the first quarter
FY95 through the fourth quarter FY99 (September 1994
through August 1999), the period when the enhanced
program was in effect.
Organization of the Integrated Program
At the beginning of the intervention period, weekly
meetings were initiated to review the ongoing short- and long-
term trends in nosocomial infections within the center as well
as activities of the infection control professionals and
microbiology laboratory personnel; any needed changes were
determined. The organizational structure for selecting
microbes for typing was shared by the medical directors of
infection control and clinical microbiology (12). During the
study period, all VRE recovered from clinical and surveillance
cultures were routinely genomically typed so that data were
current within 2 weeks of an isolate’s recovery. Periodic
routine typing for surveillance of fluoroquinolone-resistant
P. aeruginosa, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA), Enterobacter cloacae, and Clostridium difficile was
also done. Additional organisms for typing were selected by
this working group through surveillance of microbiology
culture reports discussed at the weekly meeting. The clinical
microbiology laboratory referred organisms to the molecular
typing section for analysis whenever requested to do so by this
group.
Microbial Typing
Fingerprinting is done by extracting genomic DNA
according to the technique of Pitcher et al.,  using the
guanidium thiocyanate/EDTA/Sarkosyl (GES) reagent (17).
Genomic DNA is digested with various enzymes according to
the manufacturer’s recommendation (GIBCO BRL,
Gaithersburg, MD). Enzymes are selected based on published
reports as well as ongoing experience within the typing
section. When needed, two enzymes are used for typing to
ensure the presence or absence of clonality. DNA fragments
are separated into patterns by running them through an
agarose gel with constant field electrophoresis. Usual run
times are 16 to 24 hours, and the resultant gels are then
stained with a nucleic acid bonding fluorescent agent, SYBR
Green I (Molecular Probes; Eugene, OR), and visualized with
UV illumination. Gels are imaged with a photo documenta-
tion system, Gel Print 2000i (Biophotonics; Ann Arbor, MI).
The gels are photographed so that the molecular weight
marker extends 6 cm to 7 cm in the image (the portion of the
gel used for analysis [18]). Similarities between the new and
reference types are scored by visual comparison of each 1-mm
segment of the top 60 mm of the DNA band pattern. A
similarity index is calculated from the number of identical
1-mm segments expressed as a percentage of the total number
of 1-mm segments measured. More than six differences in the
1-mm segments constitute a similarity index of <90% and call
for designation of a new type. Types are designated by letters,
and a distinct band pattern within a type (similarity index
>90%, but <100%) is designated by subscript Arabic numbers,
indicating a subtype (e.g., A0, A1, A2). Subsequent organisms
of the same genus and species are then compared with each
main type or subtype to determine clonality. Organisms
within the same type are considered related to each other for
epidemiologic linkage.
Analysis of Cost Data
The hospital management engineering database was
used to determine the total cost of inpatient care. Patient mix
data were then used to determine the mean weighted cost per
day for hospitalization within our center. The information
used for cost calculations in this report is from 1999. The
mean number of annual discharges was approximately
33,000 in 1995 to 39,000 in 1999, with an average of 36,444.
We used the U.S. weighted mean of 4 days as the excess length
of stay for a nosocomial infection in determining cost per
patient (3). All other numbers in our calculations came
directly from Northwestern Memorial Hospital data.
The resources needed for operating the molecular typing
section were based on the cost of equipment, remodeling,
reagent and other supplies, salaries and benefits for three
technologists, plus all the institutional assessments (e.g.,
full-cost basis) required to operate a hospital laboratory. The
nosocomial infection data in the two periods were analyzed by
the Student t test (two-tailed distribution).
Results
The initial impetus to develop our more integrated
approach to infection control was VRE’s emergence as a
serious nosocomial problem. Use of molecular typing in an
ongoing analysis of vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus
faecium,  the most important species in this epidemic,
revealed that our persisting problem had evolved into a
pattern of numerous “mini” patient-to-patient outbreaks of
distinct clones rather than the spread of a single persisting
strain (19). By assessing the VRE problem, we found that
genomic typing could readily separate possible episodes of
nosocomial infection spread into groupings of those that were
likely, possibly, and unlikely due to patient-to-patient
transmission (20). We could best use the typing capability to
determine the probability of high microbial clonality (more
than 90% of outbreak strains clonal), indicating patient-to-
patient transmission; the probability of moderate clonality,
suggestive of a nosocomial outbreak (35% to 75% clonality); or
the probability of clonality with little evidence of horizontal
spread (<20% clonality). Using this information, we
determined what intervention was likely to control an
apparent outbreak (20).
With a fully operational in-house typing facility, we were
also able to use this resource to manage other nosocomial
infections. During the last 2 years of this study, 25 possible
microbial outbreaks were investigated by the typing
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P. aeruginosa, MRSA, E. cloacae,  and C. difficile.  A
description of a few investigated episodes illustrates how we
use the typing information.
Classic Spread of Nosocomial Infection
Nineteen isolates of vancomycin-resistant E. faecalis
from 16 patients were detected in the microbiology laboratory
in a 2-month period; isolates from 14 were from one of two
clones (88%), indicating a high probability of nosocomial
spread (14). Reviewing the origin of the culture requisitions in
the microbiology laboratory did not indicate a possibility of
close contact. However, an in-depth investigation found a
direct connection between 11 of the 14 patients (14).
Reinforcing infection control practices aborted the outbreak.
Moderate Likelihood of Spread of Nosocomial Infections
During a 1-month period, invasive infections caused by
five isolates each of Klebsiella pneumoniae, S. epidermidis,
and S. hemolyticus were detected in a special-care unit. DNA
typing indicated 40% to 60% clonality for each of the bacterial
species. This clustering was investigated, and patients with
genetically identical organisms occupied adjacent beds.
Erecting a barrier on the unit, along with educating medical
staff, halted the spread of these infections (15).
Outbreaks not Caused by Patient-to-Patient Spread
Suspected outbreaks consisting of four isolates of
K. pneumoniae and 64 strains of Serratia marcescens were
investigated in the ICUs of two hospitals. Both investigations
showed  21% clonality, indicating unlikely patient-to-patient
spread. Investigation suggested suboptimal handling of
ventilator equipment, and both outbreaks were stopped by
retraining of personnel using this equipment (12,15).
Pseudooutbreaks
Possible outbreaks occurred in the special-care nursery
units of two hospitals, each of which had its own molecular
typing section. One possible outbreak consisted of seven S.
aureus strains, and the other of four isolates of gram-negative
bacilli. Both sets of isolates were immediately typed and no
(20%) clonality existed. No interventions were instituted, and
the apparent outbreaks were determined to be normal
variation in infections (15,21). Because of the rapid typing,
one hospital avoided culture-based surveillance investigation
of staff by the state department of health, and the other
avoided closing the unit for a 30-day full disinfection and
cleaning (done in previous suspected outbreaks).
Impact of Program Enhancements on
Nosocomial Infections and Health-Care Cost
After molecular typing was added to our hospital
infection control program, nosocomial infections decreased, as
measured by the infection rate per 1,000 patient days
(Figure 1) and the proportion of patients with infections
(Figure 2). The mean nosocomial infection rate fell from 6.49/
1,000 patient days (standard deviation [SD] = ±0.66) in FY93-
FY94 to 5.60/1,000 patient days (SD = ±0.74) in FY95-FY99 (p
= 0.002). The percentage of patients with nosocomial infection
dropped 23%, decreasing from 3.34% (SD = ±0.26) in the two
preintervention years to 2.56% (SD = ±0.30) during the 5
years of our expanded program (p = 0.000006). The weighted
cost of care per day in our hospital for FY95 was $1,650, and
for FY99 it was $1,907. This increase was primarily due to
steadily increasing severity of illness, largely from an
increased volume of patients in our solid organ and bone
marrow transplantation programs. The mean number of
patients with nosocomial infections decreased by 283 per
year, a reduction of more than 1,100 inpatient days. The costs
Figure 1. Impact of the availability of a molecular typing facility on
overall nosocomial infections/1,000 patient days at Northwestern
Memorial Hospital. The mean rate during FY93 to FY94 was 6.49,
designated by a heavy horizontal bar. Throughout FY95 through
FY99, the mean nosocomial infection rate was 5.60/1,000 patient
days, represented by the second (lower) heavy horizontal bar.
Figure 2. Impact of a molecular typing facility on percentage of
patients with nosocomial infections at Northwestern Memorial
Hospital. The mean rate during FY93 and FY94 was 3.34%,
designated by a heavy horizontal bar. Throughout FY95 through
FY99 the mean rate was 2.56%, represented by the second (lower)
heavy horizontal bar.309 Vol. 7, No. 2, March–April 2001 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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avoided by using this calculation averaged more than
$2,150,000/year, based on 1999 dollars.
The cost of this more integrated program was modest.
Representatives from infection control, infectious diseases,
pharmacy, and clinical microbiology now meet together for 45
minutes each week to assess health-care associated infection
problems and determine what needs to be done. For
microbiology, the equipment and remodeling cost for opening
the typing laboratory totaled $180,050. By the fifth year, costs
in the laboratory section were stable. The cost for the
laboratory, including three medical technologists, is $400,000
yearly. Virtually all these costs are borne by the hospital.
Discussion
While we agree that new ways to assess infection control
outcomes are needed (22), we chose two accepted measures
and focused on our own hospital data that remained
consistently assessed throughout the study. One measure was
the nosocomial infection rate using 1,000 patient days as the
denominator. This rate compensated for any reduced length of
stay and increased number of admissions during the
observation period. During this period, the mean hospital
length of stay dropped from 6.1 to 4.1 days, admissions
increased from 31,000 to 39,000, total hospital days decreased
from 190,000 to slightly more than 164,000, and overall
severity of illness increased. The mean hospital-acquired
infection rate during the preintervention period was 6.49/
1,000 patient days. In the first 2 years after the intervention,
it had fallen to 5.79/1,000 patient days, and the overall 5-year
intervention rate was 5.60/1,000 days, indicating the ability
to maintain improved control of health-care associated
infections over the long term. By contrast, the national
average nosocomial infection rate per 1,000 patient days rose
from 7.18 to 9.77 between 1975 and 1995, despite patient
length of stay’s falling from 7.9 to 5.3 days, and admissions
declining from 37.7 million to 35.9 million (2). Our own rate
has remained flat since our intervention period began, even
though an increase (because our patients are more severely
ill) might have been anticipated. This further suggests a
continued positive outcome of the new integrated approach to
our overall infection control program.
Our intrahospital comparison shows that before the
enhanced approach was introduced, nosocomial infection
developed in 3.3% of patients. In the 60 months after the
practice change, health-care associated infections developed
in 2.6% of admitted patients. More than 1,400 fewer patients
acquired infections during this time, averting more than 50
expected deaths (23). Even with endemic vancomycin-
resistant E. faecium, most of our outbreaks involve three or
fewer patients (19).
While it is difficult to extrapolate beyond one’s own
medical center for an interhospital comparison (24), when our
outcome is compared to what would be expected from the
national average nosocomial infection rate of 4.4% to 5% of
admitted patients in 1994 (23-25), and 1995 (2), the sustained
rate reduction to <2.6% each year suggests that a predicted
nosocomial infection was prevented in at least 2,600 patients
during these 5 years at Northwestern Memorial Hospital as
compared to the average 700-bed U.S. hospital.
Any of several molecular typing systems may be
appropriate for determining microbial clonality, including
restriction of genomic DNA with conventional electrophoresis
(REA analysis), pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE), and
rRNA gene probing (ribotyping). All methods are highly
reproducible and have been applied to outbreaks. REA and
PFGE have been shown equally effective for typing of VRE
and C. difficile (20,26).
Typing of strains and assessment of clonality is usually
available within 1 week of determining that an outbreak may
exist and isolating suspected microbes. We have accom-
plished typing in as little as 48 hours. Identifying strains as
clonal implies patient-to-patient spread and calls for
enhanced infection control (barrier) precautions. Lack of
clonality suggests other reasons for the apparent outbreak,
such as antimicrobial-agent use pressure, failure of
appropriate nursing-care practices, or simply random
variation in the number of infections. Early knowledge of
whether microbial clonality is present or absent focuses the
scope of an investigation and facilitates appropriate
intervention.
Even preventing asymptomatic colonization in health-
care institutions is important since subsequent infection by
virulent pathogens can have serious consequences (27). Our
experience suggests that molecular typing technology can be
very useful even when applied to a single medical center if it
is part of a comprehensive infection control program.
Additional opportunities for use of molecular testing in
detecting nosocomial multidrug-resistant pathogens will
present themselves. Stosor et al. have demonstrated the
capacity for rapid, sensitive detection of VRE contained in
rectal swabs from colonized patients (28). These researchers
reported that the cost of rapid detection using the polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) was equal to one day of glove isolation,
and that the PCR could be completed in a single 8-hour
workday. As gene chip technology moves into clinical use,
detecting a large number of resistance determinants soon
after a patient is admitted to the hospital should be possible.
A microbiology laboratory fully equipped to cooperate in
the management of nosocomial infections will also have the
necessary infrastructure to act as a sentinel to detect new
antimicrobial agent resistance, detect foodborne outbreaks of
infection, and recognize and isolate pathogen(s) responsible
for a bioterrorist attack. However, building such an
infrastructure is not inexpensive and likely will not be
undertaken by most hospitals when reimbursement for
laboratory testing is declining. A system of incentives for
hospitals to equip hospital-based microbiology laboratories
with the needed tools is required. We suggest an approach
that offers medical centers annual $300,000 to $500,000
federal grants to start a program of enhanced, comprehensive
health-care infection control and prevention as described in
this report. These grants could be administered through a
federal program such as the Agency for Health-Care Research
and Quality or the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, and monitored by current laboratory credential
agencies such as the College of American Pathologists or the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health-Care Organiza-
tions. Rules for participation should be developed by
professional societies with expertise in infection control and
prevention. While such a grant program would cost up to $2
billion each year if all U.S. hospitals participated, the
projected reduction in cost of treating nosocomial infections
could reach over five times that amount. Monitoring
compliance and outcome should be part of the annual grant
renewal process. Such an approach is consistent with a
recently released report delineating the federal response to310 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 7, No. 2, March–April 2001
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reducing medical errors (29). Our data strongly suggest such
an investment will not only reduce illness and death but also
avert the high costs of treating avoidable infections.
Nearly 15 years ago, Haley et al. estimated that a 30%
reduction in nosocomial infection would result in $300,000 of
actual savings for each 250 beds in a single institution (30).
The data from our 700-bed medical center substantiate their
estimate, and the annual cost reduction of approximately $2
million is comparable to the $825,000 they estimated for our
size institution, based on the mid-1980s dollars and health-
care costs. Several years ago Lupski suggested the potential
power of molecular epidemiology in assessing hospital
outbreaks of nosocomial infection (31). He indicated that to
gain acceptance, molecular methods need to be easy to
perform; provide rapid, reliable information; give additional
data not otherwise readily obtainable; and be cost-effective.
Our experience has been that a highly integrated infection
control program including a molecular typing section fulfills
these criteria. The program currently in place, incorporating
microbial genetic typing, is within the recently recommended
infrastructure guidelines for essential activities of infection
control and epidemiology in hospitals (32). Broadening such
an approach for managing nosocomial infections to most U.S.
hospitals is technically possible, medically useful, and
economically justified.
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